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 II.-44 
CHAIN, CHAIN, CHAIN—CHAIN OF 
(PHARMA) FOOLS: WHY THIRD PARTY 
PAYORS MAINTAIN THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSAL CHAIN UNDER RICO § 1964(C) 
Abstract: On December 3, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda 
Pharmaceuticals Co. held that Third Party Payors (TPPs) may satisfy proximate 
causation in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
claims against pharmaceutical companies where they claim that, but for the 
pharmaceutical company’s failure to indicate a drug’s cancer-causing risk, they 
would not have incurred expenditures for the drug. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit 
joined the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Third Circuits and split from 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits as to whether 
TPPs are too far removed from pharmaceutical companies’ alleged fraud to satis-
fy RICO’s proximate cause requirement. This Comment argues that the Ninth 
Circuit was correct in concluding that TPPs may properly allege proximate cause, 
as its approach effectively followed Supreme Court precedent. It further argues 
that, as a matter of policy, proximate cause should not be allowed to shield phar-
maceutical companies from the damages they inflict on TPPs and the healthcare 
system at large through their fraudulent drug promotion schemes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohib-
its specific conduct constituting “a pattern of racketeering activity.”1 Section 
1964(c) of RICO, in particular, creates a civil cause of action that allows indi-
viduals harmed in their “business or property by reason of” a contravention of 
RICO § 1962 to sue and recover triple damages, expenses, and attorney’s 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968. According to the 
statute, “racketeering activity” includes numerous state and federal crimes called predicates. Id. Predi-
cates include any conduct “indictable” pursuant to certain federal statutes, specific crimes “chargea-
ble” pursuant to state law, and crimes concerning “bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related ac-
tivity” that are indictable under federal law.” Id. § 1961(1). A predicate crime triggers RICO liability 
when it involves a “pattern of racketeering activity”—a sequence of two or more connected predicates 
that, in combination, exhibit the presence of, or potential for, ongoing illegal conduct. Id.; see Anza v. 
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453, 460 (2006) (holding that proximate causation was not 
satisfied where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant increased its market share to the plaintiff’s 
detriment through a pattern of racketeering activity). RICO is set forth under Title IX of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922; see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 
U.S. 479, 486–87 (1985) (describing RICO’s legislative history). 
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fees.2 Importantly, the Supreme Court has construed the term “by reason of” to 
require a plaintiff to demonstrate both proximate and but-for causation.3 
Congress originally passed RICO as a powerful initiative to strengthen 
old approaches and develop new strategies to combat organized crime.4 Over 
the last few decades, however, RICO has developed into a tool for bringing 
common law fraud cases against lawful enterprises, including pharmaceutical 
companies.5 Pervasive pharmaceutical fraud throughout the United States con-
                                                                                                                           
 2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. 1, 3 (2016). Sec-
tion 1964(c) permits a successful plaintiff in a civil RICO matter to recoup “reasonable attorney’s 
fees.” See JOHN HAMILL, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 108:70 
(Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2016) (describing that when granting attorney’s fees, a court is required to 
establish an adequate fee quantity and then may assess if a “fee multiplier” is appropriate to apply to 
the fee quantity); see also Michael P. Kenny, Rico and Federalism: A Case for Concurrent Jurisdic-
tion, 31 B.C. L. REV. 239, 250 (1990) (arguing that in drafting the language of § 1964(c), Congress’s 
purpose was not to strip “state courts of jurisdiction” over civil RICO claims). Section 1962 creates 
four new crimes targeting the various manners through which a “pattern of racketeering activity” 
could be utilized to “infiltrate, control, or operate ‘a[n] enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities 
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.’” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 2. 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992) (ex-
plaining that standing under § 1964(c) required the plaintiff satisfy both factual causation and proxi-
mate causation); Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 
943 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining the Supreme Court’s requirement of both proximate 
and but-for causation under § 1964(c)). In defining but-for causation, the Supreme Court has ex-
plained that one of the “better established” legal concepts is that which demands that a plaintiff 
demonstrate causation. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 
1013 (2020). In tort law, this entails the plaintiff showing that his or her harm “would not have oc-
curred but for” the defendant’s prohibited action. Id. The Court has defined proximate cause as a 
mechanism to minimize parties’ liability for the consequences of their actions. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
268. The concept of proximate cause embodies “ideas of what justice demands, or of what is adminis-
tratively possible and convenient.” Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
LAW OF TORTS § 41, 264 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 4 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (noting that RICO was a forceful approach to enhance existing 
solutions and create novel strategies for combatting unlawful conduct); Painters, 943 F.3d at 1248 
(explaining that Congress initially passed RICO to reduce “organized crime”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND GANG SECTION, CRIMINAL RICO 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968: A MANUAL FOR 
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 1, 4 (6th ed. 2016) (explaining that in enacting RICO, Congress recognized 
that organized crime, and specifically La Cosa Nostra, had intruded numerous industries and unions 
on a national scale). 
 5 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498–99 (noting § 1964(c) of RICO should be interpreted to combat 
unlawful activity in all settings); Painters, 943 F.3d at 1248 (explaining that today, RICO is a means 
to fight common fraud by otherwise lawful businesses); Glenn D. West, That Pesky Little Thing 
Called Fraud: An Examination of Buyers’ Insistence Upon (and Sellers’ Too Ready Acceptance of) 
Undefined “Fraud Carve-Outs” in Acquisition Agreements, 69 BUS. LAW. 1049, 1055 (2014) (de-
scribing common law fraud in the United States). Common law fraud is a tort claim originating from 
the English cause of action, deceit. See West, supra, at 1055. In the majority of states, a plaintiff alleg-
ing common law fraud must successfully allege the following six elements: 
(i) the defendant made a representation; (ii) the representation was false; (iii) the de-
fendant acted with scienter (i.e., knew the representation was false or made it recklessly 
without sufficient knowledge as to whether it was true or false); (iv) the defendant in-
tended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (v) the plaintiff reasonably or justifi-
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tinues to inflict significant public health and economic harm that detrimentally 
impacts individual patients, payors, and our healthcare system at large.6 
In response, patients and third party payors (TPPs) have increasingly uti-
lized § 1964(c) to bring civil RICO claims against pharmaceutical companies, 
alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of drug safety and efficacy.7 TPPs are 
most commonly health insurance companies, health funds, or government pro-
grams.8 They cover health care expenditures on behalf of their members, in-
cluding prescription medication costs.9 
In light of this influx of civil RICO suits against pharmaceutical compa-
nies, courts disagree over whether TPPs may properly bring such claims.10 In 
                                                                                                                           
ably relied upon the representation; and (vi) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of 
the representation. 
Id. 
 6 See infra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (noting the public health and economic toll of 
pharmaceutical fraud in the United States in terms of patient lives lost and growing prescription drug 
costs). 
 7 See, e.g., Painters, 943 F.3d at 1248, 1251–52 (holding that TPPs may satisfy the requirement 
for proximate causation where they are the “immediate victims” of a defendant pharmaceutical com-
pany’s purported scheme to cover up drug safety risks); Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. 
Abbott Lab’ys, 873 F.3d 574, 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that fraudulent falsifications toward 
clinicians may not uphold a RICO action brought forth by TPPs because they are significantly sepa-
rated in the causal chain); In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 636, 
644 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that TPPs properly alleged proximate causation where the actions that 
supposedly gave rise to the TPPs’ harm constituted conduct identical to that which underlay the RICO 
violation: fraudulent misrepresentation of drug safety and efficacy); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales 
Pracs. Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25–26, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2013) (concluding that the TPP properly alleged 
proximate causation where it was the “primary and intended victim” of the manufacturer’s deceitful 
conduct and where its injury was a “foreseeable and natural consequence” of that conduct (quoting 
Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650, 657–58 (2008))); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 129, 134, 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the link between pharmaceutical 
fraud and the TPP’s injury too “attenuated” to satisfy proximate cause where it rested upon the auton-
omous acts of third and, in some cases, fourth parties (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 
559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010))); see also Mona Ghogomu, When Does the Chain Break? Prescribing Around 
Drug Manufacturer Fraud, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 557, 557–58 (2018) (explaining that TPPs, including 
insurance companies and healthcare plans, often file lawsuits against drug manufacturers because they 
must pay a portion of their customers’ prescription costs). 
 8 Third-Party Payer, DICTIONARY.APA.ORG (2020), https://dictionary.apa.org/third-party-payers 
[https://perma.cc/JY6L-VPNK]. A TPP is different from the first party, the patient receiving the med-
ical services, as well as from the second party, the clinician or organization providing the care. Id. 
 9 Id.; see In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634 (describing how TPPs cover the costs of patients’ medi-
cal treatment). 
 10 Compare Painters, 943 F.3d at 1251 (holding that under the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., TPPs may satisfy proximate cause when bringing civil 
RICO claims against pharmaceutical companies), and In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644 (holding that the 
TPPs satisfied proximate cause where the action giving rise to their harm was identical to the action 
constituting the RICO claims: misrepresentation of drug safety and efficacy), and In re Neurontin, 
712 F.3d at 37–39 (concluding that the TPP satisfied proximate cause where the pharmaceutical com-
pany’s sham marketing scheme only became successful upon the TPP’s payment, the very injury for 
which the TPP sought recovery), with Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578 (determining that fraudulent 
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particular, federal circuit courts are split as to whether TPPs sufficiently allege 
proximate causation when they claim that, but for the defendant pharmaceuti-
cal company’s misrepresentations, they would not have paid for the drug.11 
Central to this disagreement is the question of whether prescribing doctors and 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) act as intervening causal forces that inter-
rupt the proximate causation between drug manufacturers and TPPs.12 
This Comment argues that TPPs may properly allege proximate causation 
under § 1964(c) of RICO in claims brought against pharmaceutical companies 
for fraudulent misrepresentation of drug safety.13 Part I of this Comment intro-
duces RICO, its proximate cause requirement under § 1964(c), and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Painters & Allied 
Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co.14 
Part II discusses the circuit split and the varying approaches courts have taken 
in analyzing proximate cause.15 Lastly, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit 
was correct in holding that TPPs may adequately allege proximate cause when 
bringing civil RICO claims against pharmaceutical companies.16 
I. SECTION 1964(C) OF RICO AND THE PROXIMATE  
CAUSATION REQUIREMENT 
Section 1964(c) requires that a plaintiff satisfy proximate causation when 
bringing forth a civil RICO claim against a defendant.17 In light of this re-
quirement, courts have disagreed whether TPPs may adequately demonstrate 
proximate cause in lawsuits brought against pharmaceutical companies for 
                                                                                                                           
falsifications made to physicians were insufficient to maintain TPPs’ RICO claims against pharma-
ceutical companies), and UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134 (holding that proximate causation is not 
met where TPPs are too far removed in the causal chain of pharmaceutical fraud). 
 11 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1251 (holding TPPs may satisfy proximate cause pursuant to Bridge); see 
Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578 (concluding that TPPs may not satisfy proximate cause where the 
pharmaceutical company made falsifications to doctors, not TPPs); In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644–45 
(holding proximate cause properly alleged where TPPs claimed that the unlawful actions that caused 
their injury were the same actions constituting the RICO violation); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 39–
40 (noting that the causal connection between TPP and drug manufacturer was “anything but attenuat-
ed”); UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 136 (concluding that the TPPs’ causal theory was too remote to 
satisfy the “direct relation” requirement of proximate cause under RICO). 
 12 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1257 (defining an “intervening cause” as “a later cause of independent origin 
that was not foreseeable”); see Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending, COM-
MONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/explainer/
2019/apr/pharmacy-benefit-managers-and-their-role-drug-spending [https://perma.cc/5P6R-TMA4] 
(explaining that PBMs are “companies that manage prescription drug benefits on behalf of health 
insurers, Medicare Part D drug plans, large employers, and other payers”). 
 13 See infra notes 64–84. 
 14 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968; infra notes 17–48 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 49–67 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 68–84 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 21–36 and accompanying text. 
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their alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of prescription medication safety 
and efficacy.18 Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of RICO and 
examines § 1964(c) and its proximate causation requirement.19 Section B in-
troduces the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Painters & Allied Trades District 
Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co., the most recent 
federal circuit case on this issue.20 
A. A Brief Overview of RICO and Supreme Court Jurisprudence on  
§ 1964(c) Proximate Causation Requirements 
RICO criminalizes specific actions involving a “pattern of racketeering 
activity” through the development of four novel prohibitions under § 1962.21 
Section 1964(c) provides individuals whose “business or property” was 
harmed due to one of these § 1962 violations with a civil cause of action, al-
lowing them to file a claim in federal court seeking triple damages, expendi-
tures, and attorney’s fees.”22 
To obtain standing for a civil RICO claim pursuant to § 1964(c), a plain-
tiff must demonstrate (1) a defendant’s § 1962 RICO violation, (2) harm to the 
plaintiff’s “business or property,” and (3) that this harm was “by reason of” 
that § 1962 RICO violation.23 The Supreme Court has construed the statutory 
expression “by reason of” to mean that a plaintiff must demonstrate both prox-
imate causation and but-for causation.24 The Court has explained that RICO’s 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 49–67 and accompanying text. 
 19 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968; infra notes 21–36 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. 
 21 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. 1, 1 (2016); Anza v. 
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (2006). Section 1962(a) proscribes the investment of 
moneys obtained from “a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise.” § 1962(a); RJR Nabisco, 
579 U.S. at 2. Section 1962(b) prohibits obtaining or retaining “an interest in an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity.” § 1962(b); RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 2. Section 1962(c) prohibits an 
individual working for or related to an enterprise “to conduct the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern 
of racketeering activity.” § 1962(c); RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 2. Finally, § 1962(d) proscribes con-
spiracy to contravene any of the previous prohibitions as set forth in § 1962(a)–(c). § 1962(d); RJR 
Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 2. 
 22 See § 1964(c) (setting forth that any individual harmed through a § 1962 violation has a civil 
cause of action and may recover treble damages, expenses, and attorney’s fees). 
 23 See UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting City of 
New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 439 (2d Cir. 2008)). RICO implements its rele-
vant prohibitions through both criminal and civil penalties. G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, 
Civil and Criminal RICO: An Overview of the Statute and Its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNSEL J. 36, 38 
(1997). Unlawful conduct under RICO is laid out in § 1962, whereas the criminal and civil remedies 
are set forth under § 1963 and § 1964, respectively. Id. Civil remedies under RICO include injunc-
tions, triple damages, and attorney’s fees. Id. at 41. Defendants convicted of § 1963(a) violations may 
be incarcerated or fined, and their assets may be forfeited. Id. 
 24 Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 943 F.3d 
1243, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that proximate cause prohibits suit where the injury claimed is 
too far separated from the defendant’s alleged RICO violation); see Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 
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proximate cause requirement restrains an individual’s responsibility for the 
results of their acts by prohibiting suit for a claimed injury that is too far re-
moved from the defendants’ prohibited conduct.25 As such, proximate causa-
tion requires some “direct relation” between the harm claimed and the RICO 
violation asserted.26 
The “direct relation” requirement is based on three pragmatic considera-
tions, referred to as the Holmes factors, as set forth in the Supreme Court’s 
1992 decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.27 First, the 
more remote a plaintiff’s injury is from an alleged RICO violation, the more 
difficulty the court faces in determining the extent to which that RICO viola-
tion actually brought about the plaintiff’s injury.28 Second, allowing for claims 
by plaintiffs less directly harmed, while avoiding the risk of “multiple recover-
ies,” would complicate the court’s allocation of damages.29 Third, it is unnec-
essary to contend with these issues because directly injured plaintiffs can be 
relied on to uphold the law by bringing suit.30 
In Holmes, the Court held that the plaintiff did not satisfy the proximate 
causation requirement because the plaintiff’s injury depended entirely upon the 
harm of more immediate victims who were not parties to the suit.31 It reasoned 
                                                                                                                           
503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992) (explaining that a plaintiff who alleges injury arising from the harm that 
a defendant inflicted directly on a third party is typically too far separated in the causal chain to suc-
cessfully plead proximate causation). 
 25 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 (2014) (noting 
that proximate cause typically prevents suits for a plaintiff’s claimed injuries that are entirely contin-
gent on the harms the defendant directly inflicted on third parties); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (same); 
Painters, 943 F.3d at 1248–49 (same). 
 26 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; Painters, 943 F.3d at 1248–49. 
 27 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70. The Court has utilized the “direct relation” requirement and the 
Holmes factors in its decisions dealing with the proximate cause requirement for civil RICO claims. 
Painters, 943 F.3d at 1249 (9th Cir. 2019); see Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9–
10 (2010) (noting plaintiff’s theory of proximate cause was much more drawn out than the one the 
Court dismissed in Holmes); Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008) (noting 
that the Holmes test requires a “direct relation” between the alleged RICO violation and the plaintiff’s 
injury, which courts should examine using the Holmes factors); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 
U.S. 451, 457 (2006) (concluding that the remote link between the plaintiff’s harm and the alleged 
RICO violation raised fundamental issues pertaining to the “direct relation” requirement as set forth in 
Holmes); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70 (holding that central to the proximate cause analysis is whether 
a “direct relation” between the plaintiff’s harm and the alleged illegal conduct exists). 
 28 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269. 
 29 See id. (explaining that allowing indirectly harmed individuals to recover would force the Court 
to assign damages to plaintiffs separated at diverse degrees of injury from the RICO violation to elim-
inate the likelihood of numerous recoveries). 
 30 Id. at 269–70. 
 31 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271; see Canyon Cnty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 981 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (noting that the Court in Holmes prevented a RICO suit where a plaintiff’s harm was whol-
ly conditional on the harms suffered by the “direct victims”). The plaintiff in Holmes, the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), alleged that the defendants, individuals from a brokerage 
firm, engaged in a stock manipulation ploy, causing two broker-dealers to become insolvent and forc-
ing the plaintiff to assume their debts. 503 U.S. at 262–63. SIPC is a private nonprofit corporation to 
II.-50 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
that only the directly injured parties may recover because courts generally 
hesitate to go beyond the first level of harm when awarding damages.32 
In 2006, in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., the Supreme Court clarified 
that the proximate cause requirement from Holmes barred plaintiffs from 
bringing RICO claims for harms completely derivative of the direct injury the 
defendants caused.33 Thus, under Anza, courts must closely analyze the causal 
relationship between the alleged RICO violation and a plaintiff’s harm to de-
termine the character of the violation and the precise origin of the plaintiff’s 
harm.34 Where the alleged RICO violation is not the direct cause of the plain-
tiff’s harm, proximate causation is inadequate.35 
Finally, in 2008, in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., the Court 
explained that first-party reliance on the alleged fraud is not necessary to satis-
fy proximate cause, thereby allowing for RICO recovery in cases where a 
wrong committed against a third party directly injured the plaintiff.36 
B. Factual and Procedural History of Painters 
In 2019, in Painters, the Ninth Circuit held that in civil RICO suits 
against pharmaceutical companies, TPPs may satisfy proximate cause where 
they allege that, but for the defendant’s failure to disclose a drug’s identified 
safety risk, they would not have purchased that drug.37 
In Painters, a group of five individual patients (Patients) and a TPP, 
Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund (Painters 
                                                                                                                           
which membership is mandatory for the majority of registered broker-dealers. Id. at 261. Pursuant to 
the Securities Investor Protection Act, SIPC manages the “liquidation of member firms that close 
when the firms are bankrupt or in financial trouble, and customer assets are missing.” Mission, SIPC, 
https://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/sipc-mission [https://perma.cc/873E-K4XF]; see 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc 
(setting forth the relevant provisions pursuant to which the SIPC was established). The defendants 
undertook the alleged stock manipulation ploy between 1964 and 1981 when they “manipulated stock 
of six companies” by setting forth excessively confident declarations regarding the stock’s potential 
and by selling limited shares to develop the façade of a “liquid market.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 262. The 
broker-dealers purchased significant numbers of the stock themselves. Id. When the stocks ultimately 
crashed, the broker-dealers faced major financial hardship requiring their liquidation and SIPC to pay 
out approximately $13 million to meet their clients’ claims. Id. at 262–63. 
 32 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271–72 (describing that the broad principle of the law of damages “is not 
to go beyond the first step”). 
 33 See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 459–60 (2006) (explaining that this re-
quirement eliminated the possibility that plaintiffs whose injuries were only remotely linked to the 
defendant’s RICO violation could recover for their injuries). 
 34 Id. at 457–58. 
 35 Id. at 458–60. The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York 
further solidified this approach. 559 U.S. 1, 15 (2010). There, a plurality of Justices held proximate 
cause was not satisfied where there were several steps in between the alleged fraud and the plaintiff’s 
injury and where there were third parties involved. Id. 
 36 Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 648–49, 661 (2008). 
 37 Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 943 F.3d 
1243, 1246, 1257 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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Fund), filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Louisiana against Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., its parent com-
pany, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., and Eli Lilly & Co. (collectively, 
Takeda).38 Takeda developed and marketed Actos, a type 2 diabetes prescrip-
tion drug, whose long-term use the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sub-
sequently declared to be associated with bladder cancer.39 
The plaintiffs represented a class of similarly situated TPPs and patients 
who spent money on or incurred expenses for Actos.40 The plaintiffs asserted 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. at 1246–47. Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited owns Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc. and controls 75% of its stock. Brief for Petitioner at ii, Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 
Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 943 F.3d 1243 (No. 19-1069). Takeda Pharmaceuticals Interna-
tional AG owns the other 25% of its stock. Id. The Painters Fund is a TPP that provides “health and wel-
fare benefits” to beneficiaries. Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247. TPPs, including health insurance companies 
and health funds, cover medical treatment, which includes prescription drug costs for members and their 
dependents. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 634 (3d Cir. 2015). 
Prescription drug coverage under TPPs depends on the inclusion of a drug in the TPP’s formulary. Id. A 
formulary is a consistently modified catalogue of prescription medications the payor permits for reim-
bursement. What Is a Formulary?, PHARMACEUTICAL CARE MGMT. ASS’N, https://www.pcmanet.org/
pcma-cardstack/what-is-a-formulary/ [https://perma.cc/SB7S-ZXQL]. Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
(PBMs) develop TPP’s formularies by assessing data on a drug’s “cost effectiveness, safety, and effi-
cacy.” In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35. Upon a PBM’s conclusion that a drug provides competitive 
benefits compared to similar drugs, the PBM will provide the drug favored standing on the formulary. 
Id. at 635. Favored standing on a formulary allows the TPP to offer expanded coverage of the drug. Id. 
Increased coverage on the part of the TPP results in covered members receiving a decreased co-
payment for the drug when it is prescribed. Id. A co-payment is a specific dollar figure an individual 
pays for a prescription drug. See Copayment, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/
co-payment/ [https://perma.cc/2T36-NZME] (describing that co-payments may vary for different 
types of medical care, such as drugs, labs, and visits). 
 39 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1246. On September 17, 2010, upon subsequent investigations of Actos that 
demonstrated a potential connection between the drug and bladder cancer, the FDA declared that it was 
undertaking a safety analysis of Actos. Id. The safety analysis entailed assessment of data from a “ten-
year epidemiological study” to determine whether an association existed between Actos and an elevated 
probability of bladder cancer. See FDA Drug Safety Communication: Ongoing Safety Review of Actos 
(pioglitazone) and Potential Increased Risk of Bladder Cancer After Two Years Exposure, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/fda-drug-
safety-communication-ongoing-safety-review-actos-pioglitazone-and-potential-increased-risk [https://
perma.cc/V9EF-DDW8] (describing that evidence from animal and human investigations demonstrat-
ed a possible safety risk requiring further assessment). The FDA released an official warning on June 
15, 2011, which declared that long-term use of Actos may be associated with bladder cancer in patients. 
Painters, 943 F.3d at 1246. Shortly after issuance of the FDA’s alerts, sales of Actos dropped by roughly 
80%. Id. 
 40 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247. Similarly situated TPPs and patients were those who incurred ex-
penditures for Actos for uses besides resale and did not include consumers currently pursuing a personal 
injury action stemming from their use of the drug. Id. The patients all suffered from type 2 diabetes, and 
their clinicians prescribed them Actos to decrease their blood sugar. Id. The patients alleged that they 
paid “out-of-pocket” expenditures for Actos and that neither they nor their clinicians were aware of the 
connection between Actos and bladder cancer when they started taking the medication. Id. The patients 
claimed that as soon as they learned of the increased risk of bladder cancer, they stopped using Actos. Id. 
Patients further alleged that had they been aware of the possibility of bladder cancer caused by Actos, 
they would not have consumed the drug nor submitted reimbursement claims to their individual TPPs. Id. 
The Painters Fund reimbursed their members’ claims for Actos, which covered healthcare providers and 
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that Takeda “conspired to commit mail and wire fraud” by intentionally de-
ceiving clinicians, patients, and TPPs into thinking that Actos did not elevate 
an individual’s risk for bladder cancer.41 Pursuant to § 1964(c) of RICO, the 
plaintiffs sought to recoup the costs they incurred when they purchased Actos 
under the notion that it was harmless.42 The court held that the plaintiffs failed 
to establish that Takeda’s “acts and omissions” proximately caused their 
sought-after damages.43 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which re-
versed the dismissal of the RICO claims.44 The Ninth Circuit followed Su-
preme Court precedent in focusing its analysis on whether a “direct relation” 
existed between the claimed RICO violation and the plaintiff’s injury.45 In 
reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit determined that although prescribing 
physicians act as intermediaries between the pharmaceutical fraud and the 
                                                                                                                           
pharmacies submitted. Id. Painters Fund alleged it depended on members to file claims for prescriptions 
that were clinically required, as well as safe and effective. Id. In other words, the Painters Fund assumed 
that patients and clinicians would make educated choices about which medication would be prescribed 
and, thus, filed for reimbursement. Id. 
 41 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (setting forth the relevant provisions of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes, respectively). To be found guilty of mail or wire fraud, a plaintiff must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) undertook a ploy to defraud that involved “material decep-
tion”; (2) with the requisite “intent to defraud”; (3) through utilization of the mail or wires in actualiz-
ing the ploy; (4) and that the ploy caused or would have caused the relevant economic harm. William 
M. Sloan, Mail and Wire Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 905, 908 (2011). Here, the plaintiffs claimed 
that although Takeda learned through various investigations that Actos elevated patients’ risk of getting 
bladder cancer, it did not modify Actos’s warning label or notify the public. Painters, 943 F.3d at 1246. 
The plaintiffs asserted that Takeda deceived the FDA, prescribing physicians, patients, and TPPs into 
believing that Actos did not increase bladder cancer risk to maximize profits from Actos sales. Id. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the patients depended on Takeda’s falsifications about Actos when they purchased 
the drug, that clinicians depended on these misleading statements when prescribing the drug, and that 
TPPs depended on these falsifications when covering the drug’s costs for beneficiaries. Id. at 1247. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that had they known that Actos elevated a patient’s chance of bladder 
cancer, they would not have bought the drug. Id. 
 42 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (setting forth the requirements for recovery 
in civil suits under RICO). The plaintiffs did not, however, seek to recoup any damages associated with 
any patient’s ingestion of the drug. Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247. 
 43 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247–48. The district court dismissed the RICO claims with prejudice un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care 
Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., No. 17-cv-07223-AS, at 1–2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2018) (order partially 
granting motion to dismiss); see FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(6) (explaining that one affirmative defense 
a defendant may assert is the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). The court 
cited to several cases as persuasive authority, including Sidney Hillman Health Center of Rochester v. 
Abbott Laboratories when dismissing the case. Painters, 17-cv-07223-AS, at 1–2; see Sidney Hillman 
Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Lab’ys, 873 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that TPPs are 
too far removed from the causal chain of a pharmaceutical company’s fraud to satisfy proximate 
cause). 44 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247–48, 1260. 
 44 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1247–48, 1260. 
 45 See id. at 1257 (noting that the court’s conclusion was aligned with the Supreme Court’s man-
date that the proximate cause analysis center around the “direct relation” between the claimed RICO 
violation and the plaintiff’s alleged harm). 
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TPP’s injury, they do not serve as “intervening causes” that sever proximate 
causation.46 The court reasoned that because the pharmaceutical company 
manufactured a prescription drug, as opposed to an over-the-counter drug, it 
was always necessary for clinicians to prescribe the drug.47 Therefore, it was 
probable that prescribing clinicians would in some way contribute to the causal 
chain of the fraud.48 
II. MAINTAINING THE CAUSAL CHAIN: HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED 
RICO’S PROXIMATE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT IN THE  
CONTEXT OF PHARMACEUTICAL FRAUD 
In 2019, in Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care 
Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that a TPP’s injuries are not too remote from a defendant pharma-
ceutical company’s alleged scheme to defraud to satisfy § 1964(c)’s proximate 
causation requirement.49 In so doing, it joined the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the First and Third Circuits and split from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Seventh Circuits regarding whether TPPs bringing civil RICO 
claims against pharmaceutical companies may properly allege proximate cau-
sation.50 Section A of this Part discusses the proximate causation analysis of 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. The court explained that an intervening cause constitutes a subsequent cause “of independ-
ent origin that was not foreseeable.” Id. The court reasoned that because the clinicians’ prescribing of 
Actos was not only anticipated, but also required, their “causative role” in the pharmaceutical fraud 
was entirely foreseeable. Id. Therefore, the clinicians could not constitute an intervening cause be-
tween the fraud and the TPP’s harm. Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. (noting that because Actos was a prescription medication, patients had to obtain a clini-
cian’s prescription to acquire the drug). The court also explained that, due to the organization of the 
U.S. healthcare system, the pharmaceutical company was aware that TPPs, and not prescribing clinicians, 
would pay for the drug. Id. (quoting In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 38–39 
(1st Cir. 2013)); see In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 645 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (noting that TPPs alleged that the pharmaceutical company knew that TPPs would be cov-
ering the drug expenditures). 
 49 See Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that a TPP meets the proximate cause requirement 
where it is an “immediate victim[]” of a defendant pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent scheme). 
 50 Compare Painters, 943 F.3d at 1257 (noting the First and Third Circuits’ approaches to proxi-
mate causation were correct as they were better aligned with Supreme Court jurisprudence), and In re 
Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 644, 646 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that 
the TPPs properly alleged proximate causation where the conduct that directly harmed them was the 
same conduct that gave rise to the RICO violation), and In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 
712 F.3d 21, 37 (1st Cir. 2013) (concluding that a TPP properly alleged proximate causation where it 
was the principal and anticipated victim of the pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent ploy and where 
its injury was a “foreseeable and natural consequence” of the ploy (quoting Bridge v. Phx. Bond & 
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 657–58 (2008))), with Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott 
Lab’ys, 873 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that misrepresentations made to clinicians do not 
satisfy proximate cause for TPPs because these actions are too removed from the sequence of events), 
and UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134, 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
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the Second and Seventh Circuits.51 Section B explores the contrasting ap-
proach of the First and Third Circuits in evaluating whether a direct relation-
ship exists between TPPs and drug manufacturers.52 Finally, Section C dis-
cusses how the Ninth Circuit adopted the First and Third Circuits’ approach.53 
A. The Second and Seventh Circuits’ Approach 
In 2010, in UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Second Circuit held 
that too many levels of independent actions separated a pharmaceutical com-
pany’s fraudulent scheme and TPPs’ drug payments to uphold proximate cause 
under Supreme Court precedent.54 Similarly, in 2017, in Sidney Hillman 
Health Center of Rochester v. Abbott Laboratories, the Seventh Circuit joined 
the Second Circuit, holding that the TPPs’ injury was too remote from the 
fraudulent conduct to uphold proximate causation.55 
The common thread between the Second and Seventh Circuits’ decisions 
is their determination that the numerous levels of independent actions between 
fraudulent drug promotion and TPPs’ drug payments make TPPs too far re-
moved in the line of causation to satisfy proximate cause.56 The Second Cir-
cuit, in particular, emphasized the fact that the pharmaceutical company’s al-
leged improper marketing was directed toward physicians, not TPPs.57 Be-
                                                                                                                           
link between pharmaceutical fraud and the TPPs’ injury was too “attenuated” to satisfy proximate 
cause because third and fourth parties, in part, caused the injury). 
 51 See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 54 UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134. In a class action lawsuit, covered members and TPPs 
brought civil RICO claims against a pharmaceutical company, alleging that it distorted its drug’s safety 
and efficacy and encouraged its off-label use despite a lack of safety data. Id. at 123. Off-label promo-
tion is a strategy wherein pharmaceutical manufacturers and other entities promote “FDA-approved 
drugs for unapproved uses.” Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the 
First Amendment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 239 (2014), https://www.pennlawreview.com/
2014/04/07/off-label-drug-promotion-and-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/B5KR-3Q5G]. Un-
approved uses are those that the FDA has not yet authorized as safe and effective. See Elizabeth Rich-
ardson, Off-Label Drug Promotion, HEALTH AFFS. (Jun. 20, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/ [https://perma.cc/5LD2-J86B] (describing how the FDA does 
not regulate the process by which clinicians prescribe medications and the extent to which off-label 
prescribing occurs in the United States). 
 55 Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578. The plaintiffs, various TPPs, requested class certification to 
bring civil RICO claims against a pharmaceutical company for covering up its role in endorsing off-
label uses to clinicians. Id. at 575. 
 56 Id. at 578; UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134. 
 57 See UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134 (noting that, critically, the TPPs did not claim they 
actually relied on the pharmaceutical company’s fraud, which was specifically targeted toward clini-
cians). The Second Circuit noted the numerous causal steps between a pharmaceutical company’s 
fraud and TPPs’ economic injury, including physicians depending on the falsifications, TPPs depend-
ing on the medical opinion of PBMs, and TPPs declining to negotiate drug price. Id. The court con-
cluded that the actions directly harming the plaintiffs were independent from the action that constitut-
ed the fraud. Id. 
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cause the TPPs did not depend on the misstatements, the Second Circuit de-
termined that they were too far removed from the fraud to satisfy proximate 
cause.58 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit noted that improper “off-label promo-
tion” affected the doctors’ actions rather than the actions of the TPPs.59 The 
Seventh Circuit also emphasized that because it was unclear whether TPPs 
were the first or only party injured by the pharmaceutical fraud, they could not 
establish proximate cause.60 
B. The First and Third Circuits’ Approach 
In contrast, in 2013, in In re Neurontin Marketing & Sales Practices Liti-
gation, the First Circuit held that when a TPP is the principal and deliberate 
victim, and the harm is “foreseeable,” a clinician’s independent decisions do 
not sever the “direct relation” required to establish proximate cause under RI-
CO.61 Similarly, in 2015, in In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices, & Prod-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. 
 59 See Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578 (noting that the inappropriate promotion of drugs for un-
approved uses impacted clinicians’ actions, as some clinicians would alter their prescribing behavior 
as a result). 
 60 See id. at 576 (noting that TPPs may suffer economic harm as a result of the pharmaceutical 
fraud, but that it was uncertain whether they were the first or the only injured entity). The Seventh 
Circuit emphasized that the law of damages tends to award damages only to those directly harmed and 
avoids recognizing secondary injuries of parties too far removed from the harms of the immediate vic-
tims. Id.; see also Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271–72 (1992) (noting the general 
pattern of the law in relation to damages is “not to go beyond the first step”). The Seventh Circuit held 
that because the harms the patients suffered, such as adverse health outcomes and financial loss, occurred 
before the harms the TPPs suffered, TPPs were not the “initially injured party.” Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d 
at 576. Moreover, the court noted that assessing patients’ health expenditures, in addition to those of the 
TPPs, may be challenging. Id. The court further noted that clinicians may also be harmed by the pharma-
ceutical fraud due to lost profits resulting from prescribing “ineffective medicine,” thereby impacting 
their practice as a whole. Id. The court additionally remarked that apportioning damages may be difficult 
where the deceptive marketing scheme may not have influenced some physicians’ prescribing decisions 
and where some off-label uses of the prescription may have actually helped certain patients. Id. at 577. 
 61 In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2013). The defendant 
pharmaceutical company appealed jury and court verdicts amounting to over $140 million in favor of the 
plaintiff TPP. Id. at 25. The verdicts occurred after a division of the pharmaceutical company agreed to 
settle criminal cases the United States had brought. Id. Through the settlement, the division of the phar-
maceutical company pleaded guilty to various counts associated with its unlawful off-label prescription 
marketing ploy and paid $140 million in criminal penalties. Id. The pharmaceutical company itself in-
curred $190 million in civil penalties. Id. In re Neurontin was one of numerous appeals pertaining to 
the unlawfully marketed prescription medication. Id. The plaintiff TPP suffered economic injury in 
covering the costs of four different kinds of off-label prescription uses. Id. The pharmaceutical company 
had promoted each of the off-label uses through its fraudulent ploy. Id. The pharmaceutical company 
claimed that, as a matter of law, the TPP’s RICO claim could not stand because proximate causation was 
lacking. Id. at 34. Specifically, it argued that there were an excessive number of steps in the chain of 
proximate causation between its fraudulent representations of its prescription drug and the TPP’s eco-
nomic harm. Id. The First Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the award of damages to the TPP. 
Id. at 25, 51. The court relied on Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. and Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indemnity Co. in noting that the TPP did not have to demonstrate first-party reliance on the 
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uct Liability Litigation, the Third Circuit held that TPPs satisfied proximate 
causation.62 Specifically, the court noted that TPPs alleged that they main-
tained the defendant pharmaceutical company’s prescription within their for-
mularies and reimbursed it at advantageous prices because they depended on 
the defendant’s falsifications about the drug’s safety.63 
C. The Ninth Circuit Joined the First and Third Circuits 
In joining the First and Third Circuits’ approach and departing from that 
of the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that 
the causal chain between a pharmaceutical company’s fraud and a TPP’s injury 
is too attenuated to uphold the “direct relation” requirement.64 The Ninth Cir-
cuit did not accept that the existence of “intermediaries,” including prescribing 
clinicians, severed the chain of proximate causation between pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                           
pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent statements to maintain proximate cause. See id. at 34–35, 37. 
Additionally, the court determined that the TPP was the immediate and anticipated target of the phar-
maceutical fraud. Id. at 39. 
 62 In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 636, 643, 645 (3d Cir. 
2015). The defendant pharmaceutical company appealed a denial of its motion to dismiss a class ac-
tion suit TPPs brought claiming civil RICO violations predicated on the pharmaceutical company’s 
alleged fraudulent misrepresentation of its drug’s safety. Id. at 633. The pharmaceutical company 
claimed that the lower court erred in determining that the TPPs satisfied proximate cause pursuant to 
RICO’s standing requirements. Id. at 634. The court disagreed and reasoned that the conduct giving 
rise to the TPPs’ injury was the same conduct constituting the alleged RICO violation: the pharmaceu-
tical company’s fraudulent statements regarding its drug’s safety risks. Id. at 644. The court further 
reasoned that the mere presence of intermediaries, such as clinicians, was not sufficient to sever the 
chain of proximate cause because the TPPs’ injuries were not dependent on the any injuries suffered 
by intermediaries. Id. at 645–46. 
 63 Id. at 636. The TPPs further alleged the pharmaceutical company purposefully hid major safety 
risks of its drug and persisted in encouraging its use as a safer medication for diabetes, even though 
the pharmaceutical company was aware of the drug’s established risks, such as its potential to cause 
heart attacks. Id. The TPPs claimed the pharmaceutical company distorted data and scientific publica-
tions and issued inaccurate statements to increase profits. Id. The TPPs alleged the drug was not val-
ued at the advantageous rates that they were paying and that clinicians would not have prescribed the 
drug to the extent they did had they known of the relevant safety risks. Id. 
 64 Compare Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 
943 F.3d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that under Bridge precedent, a TPP may satisfy the 
direct relation requirement when bringing civil RICO claims against pharmaceutical companies), and 
In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644, 646 (concluding that proximate cause was satisfied where the criminal 
action giving rise to the TPPs’ harm was identical to the action constituting the RICO claims: misrep-
resentation of drug safety and efficacy), and In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39 (determining that the 
TPP satisfied proximate cause where the pharmaceutical company’s sham marketing scheme only 
became successful upon the TPP’s payment, the very injury for which the TPP sought recovery), with 
Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578 (holding falsifications made to physicians were insufficient to main-
tain TPPs’ RICO claims against pharmaceutical companies), and UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that proximate causation was not met where TPPs 
were too far removed in the causal chain of pharmaceutical fraud). 
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companies and TPPs.65 Instead, it held that the causative chain was not severed 
because the pharmaceutical companies were well aware that, due to the organi-
zation of the U.S. healthcare system, clinicians would not cover drug costs.66 
As a result, TPPs could meet both the “direct relation” and the Holmes factors 
requirements and sufficiently allege proximate cause.67 
III. WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY MAINTAINED  
THE CAUSAL CHAIN 
In 2019, in Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund 
v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co., the Ninth Circuit correctly held that a TPP may 
satisfy proximate cause in cases involving civil RICO claims against pharmaceu-
tical companies that fraudulently misrepresent drug safety and efficacy.68 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Painters, 943 F.3d at 1257 (concluding that although prescribing clinicians may serve as 
“intermediaries” between the pharmaceutical fraud and the TPP’s payment, they are not an “interven-
ing cause” that severs proximate causation); In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (holding that TPPs satis-
fied proximate cause where they claimed that pharmaceutical companies knew that TPPs pay for pre-
scription drug costs); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39 (determining that proximate cause was satis-
fied where the economic injury the TPP sought recovery for was that which stemmed from the phar-
maceutical company’s RICO violation). 
 66 See Painters, 943 F.3d at 1255 (noting that pharmaceutical companies recognize and under-
stand that TPPs cover the costs of their drugs); In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645–46 (noting that the 
TPPs claimed that pharmaceutical companies knew that TPPs paid for prescription costs and that their 
ploy to defraud was accomplished through such payments, which constituted the very harm that TPPs 
aimed to recover from); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39 (reasoning that the pharmaceutical com-
pany’s deceptive marketing scheme, which it designed to increase earnings, was effective only upon 
the TPP’s payments for the additional prescriptions that its fraudulent conduct brought about). 
 67 See Painters, 943 F.3d at 1251 (noting that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indemnity Co. was sufficient to conclude that TPPs satisfied the “direct relation” requirement 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)); In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (same); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38 (not-
ing that the TPP, as the intended target of the pharmaceutical fraud, experienced direct and foreseea-
ble harm as a result of the fraud). Employing the Holmes factors, the Third Circuit noted that differenti-
ating among the damages that the pharmaceutical company’s alleged violations and other unrelated fac-
tors caused would not be overly-complex, and that TPPs were best situated to sue because the defend-
ant’s RICO violation did not injure the prescribing clinicians. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644, 646; see 
Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269–71 (1992) (noting that a direct relation requires (1) 
a straightforward determination of damages caused by a defendant’s unlawful conduct; (2) a stream-
lined procedure for allocation of damages; and (3) a justified deterrent effect). The First and Ninth 
Circuits emphasized the important deterrent effect RICO liability would impose against fraudulent phar-
maceutical schemes. See Painters, 943 F.3d at 1252 (noting that the pharmaceutical company’s liabil-
ity promotes the objective of deterring harmful behavior, without including those parties who were not 
immediately harmed by financial loss); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 39 (pointing out that holding the 
pharmaceutical company liable would deter similar unlawful conduct in the future). 
 68 See Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 649 (2008) (holding that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964 does not have a first-person reliance requirement); Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 
258, 268 (1992) (describing proximate cause as the judicial means by which defendants’ liability is 
restricted to the consequences of their own conduct); Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 
Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 943 F.3d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that TPPs may 
satisfy the direct relation requirement when bringing civil RICO claims against a pharmaceutical 
company). 
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Though the Second and Seventh Circuits have determined that the causal link 
between pharmaceutical companies and TPPs is too attenuated to maintain prox-
imate causation, both Supreme Court jurisprudence and policy implications sup-
port the Ninth Circuit’s holding.69 
In the Second and Seventh Circuits’ proximate cause analysis, the courts 
emphasized that there were too many levels of “independent decisions” be-
tween the pharmaceutical fraud and the TPPs’ resulting economic injury to 
uphold any “direct relation.”70 Although the decisions of prescribing physi-
cians and PBMs play a role in the causative chain, the Second and Seventh 
Circuits’ narrow focus on these parties overlooked the essential fact that, not-
withstanding the role of prescribers, pharmaceutical fraud may still directly 
relate to a TPP’s economic injury.71 
As an initial matter, the Second and Seventh Circuits’ emphasis on the fact 
that the pharmaceutical companies made misstatements to physicians, rather 
than to TPPs, is inherently contrary to Supreme Court precedent.72 In Bridge v. 
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., the Supreme Court held that first-person reli-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Painters, 943 F.3d at 1251–52 (holding that, following Supreme Court precedent, a TPP 
may satisfy the “direct relation requirement” when bringing civil RICO claims against pharmaceutical 
companies); see, e.g., Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 14 (2010) (noting that the 
Supreme Court reiterated the need for a “direct relationship” between the plaintiff’s harm and the 
defendant’s alleged RICO violation); Bridge, 553 U.S. at 661 (holding that first-party reliance on the 
defendant’s fraud is not required to satisfy proximate cause); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 
U.S. 451, 461 (2006) (noting that when assessing a RICO claim for proximate causation, the major 
concern is whether the claimed violation “led directly” to the plaintiff’s harm); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
269 (holding that proximate cause requires a “direct relation” between the alleged RICO violation and 
the plaintiff’s damages). 
 70 Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Lab’ys, 873 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2017); 
UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 71 See Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649 (holding that a person may be harmed “by reason of” a RICO vio-
lation without having directly relied on the fraud); Anza, 547 U.S. at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting that first-person reliance on the defendant’s fraud is not required to 
satisfy proximate causation under RICO); Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578 (emphasizing that the 
pharmaceutical company made misrepresentations to clinicians and, therefore, TPPs could not recover 
under RICO); UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 136 (noting that individual clinicians may have de-
pended on the fraudulent misrepresentations to varying degrees). 
 72 Compare Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649 (holding that first-person reliance is not needed to establish 
proximate cause under civil RICO claims), and Anza, 547 U.S. at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that a party can commit a RICO violation without anyone directly rely-
ing upon the fraud), with Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 578 (emphasizing that because the pharmaceuti-
cal company made the misrepresentations to clinicians, sufficient separation existed between the fraud 
and the TPPs so as to sever proximate cause), and UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134 (highlighting 
the drawn out nature of the link between the pharmaceutical fraud and the TPPs’ injury because the 
pharmaceutical company made the misrepresentations to clinicians). The Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion in Bridge explicitly rejected the need for first-party reliance in establishing proximate causation 
in civil RICO claims. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649. Instead, the Court focused on the fact that the plaintiff’s 
injury “direct[ly] result[ed]” from the fraud and constituted a “foreseeable and natural consequence” of it. 
Id. at 657–58. The Court noted the extensive precedent that allows a directly injured plaintiff to recov-
er, despite the fact that a “third party,” rather than the plaintiff, depended on the fraud. Id. at 656. 
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ance on a defendant’s fraud is not necessary to establish proximate causation 
under RICO.73 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, correctly held that a TPP’s 
injury may have a “direct relation” with a pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent 
marketing scheme because TPPs are immediate victims of pharmaceutical fraud 
and their injury is a “foreseeable” and “natural consequence” of it.74 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit accurately applied each of the Holmes factors 
in holding that a “direct relation” may exist between pharmaceutical fraud and 
a TPP’s injury.75 First, determining the damages attributable to the pharmaceu-
tical company’s fraud would not be overly complicated because previous liti-
gation has demonstrated the feasibility of such calculations.76 Second, the 
court avoided any risk of the plaintiffs receiving “multiple recoveries” because 
the pharmaceutical fraud did not economically injure clinicians and because 
the plaintiffs did not include patients already pursuing personal injury claims 
resulting from their drug consumption.77 Third, holding pharmaceutical com-
panies liable under RICO is justified because the civil and criminal penalties 
they currently face are generally modest and often represent merely the “cost 
of doing business.”78 Allowing pharmaceutical companies to be held civilly 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649. 
 74 See id. (noting that a person may be harmed “by reason of” a pattern of fraudulent activity 
despite not having depended on the misrepresentation); Anza, 547 U.S. at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that first-person reliance on the defendant’s fraud was not 
necessary to establish proximate causation under RICO). Due to the organization of the U.S. healthcare 
system, pharmaceutical companies are well aware that TPPs, rather than physicians or PBMs, bear the 
financial burden of covering prescription medications. Painters, 943 F.3d at 1257. Furthermore, the 
Ninth Circuit was correct because disclosing the possibility that TPPs may satisfy proximate cause in 
these cases runs contrary to the understanding of proximate cause as a “flexible concept” that does not 
adhere to a “black-letter rule” that will determine the outcome across cases. See Bridge, 553 U.S. at 
649–50, 654 (noting proximate cause is a malleable principle that does not operate in the same manner 
across cases). 
 75 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (setting forth the three factors for assessing “direct relation”: (1) 
ease of assessing damages from the RICO violation; (2) avoidance of complex rules of allocating 
damages among plaintiffs; and (3) warranted deterrence of future harmful conduct); Painters 943 F.3d 
at 1251–52 (noting that (1) it would not be overly complicated to determine the TPP’s damages; (2) there 
is no concern for “duplicative recovery” where the injury experienced by the TPPs and the patients “do 
no overlap”; and (3) the value of deterring the unlawful conduct is justified under the circumstances). 
 76 See Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992) (describing the first factor as the 
need for a straightforward damages calculation pertaining to the defendant’s unlawful conduct); In re 
Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 42, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that expert 
testimony appropriately utilized “regression analysis” to calculate damages by, among other things, 
demonstrating the extent to which a pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent marketing scheme increased 
drug prescriptions). 
 77 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (noting RICO’s proximate cause requirement seeks to decrease 
the likelihood that numerous, less directly injured parties would seek to recover); Painters, 943 F.3d 
at 1247 (noting the plaintiffs represented a class of similarly situated TPPs and patients who paid for 
Actos with their own money for personal use); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 37–39 (noting that because 
clinicians do not pay for the cost of prescription drugs, there is no likelihood for recovery on their part). 
 78 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (emphasizing that proximate cause promotes the principle of de-
terring harmful behavior); Kevin Outterson, Punishing Health Care Fraud—Is the GSK Settlement 
II.-60 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
liable under RICO and exposing them to the risk of treble damages may create 
a heightened deterrence effect against future fraudulent behavior.79 
Finally, the policy implications surrounding pharmaceutical fraud also sup-
port the Ninth Circuit’s approach.80 Mounting prescription drug costs and ram-
pant pharmaceutical fraud represent major problems for the U.S. healthcare sys-
tem.81 Private health insurers, including TPPs, constitute the largest group of re-
tail prescription drug payers.82 Beyond the economic impact, pharmaceutical 
fraud has a devastating effect on public health, as it has killed thousands of pa-
tients, and it continues to pose a significant threat to patient safety.83 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
Sufficient?, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1082, 1083–84 (2012) (describing how criminal and civil fines 
commonly imposed on pharmaceutical fraud tend to constitute only a modest proportion of pharma-
ceutical companies’ total revenues). 
 79 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (setting forth the treble damages provision); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 
(emphasizing the broad interest in “deterring injurious conduct” that RICO’s proximate causation 
requirement tends to serve); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38 (holding that the TPP was best situated to 
sue drug manufacturers because it was directly harmed by their fraudulent actions); see also Outterson, 
supra note 78, at 1084 (noting that doubts persist as to the deterrent effect of corporate fines against 
pharmaceutical fraud where such fines often constitute only a “small percentage of their global reve-
nue”). 
 80 See Juliette Cubanski et al., How Does Prescription Drug Spending and Use Compare Across 




M2SZ] (noting that private health insurers bear significant costs associated with prescription drug cover-
age); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion from False Claims 
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/8CWY-C97K] (de-
scribing the billions of dollars the Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered from healthcare-related 
fraud and other matters). 
 81 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2019 
HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8AN-
BJDF] (describing the staggering increases in healthcare costs in the United States). In 2019, national 
health care costs increased to $3.8 trillion with U.S. retail prescription medication expenditures totaling 
$369.7 billion or 10% of total health care costs. Id. In 2019, the DOJ recovered over $3 billion from 
False Claims Act cases, of which $2.6 billion involved healthcare-related matters. Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., supra note 80. Two of the biggest recoveries in healthcare-related matters involved phar-
maceutical companies that fraudulently promoted opioid drugs, contributing to the ongoing opioid crisis. 
Id. In one matter, Insys Therapeutics settled civil claims alleging that it provided kickbacks to entice 
clinicians and nurse practitioners to prescribe its drug to their patients for $195 million. Id. In another 
matter, Reckitt Benckiser Group plc paid $1.4 billion to settle criminal and civil claims pertaining to its 
marketing of the opioid abuse medication Suboxone. Id. 
 82 Cubanski, supra note 80. Private health insurers, including TPPs, cover 42% of our nation’s 
retail prescriptions costs, followed by Medicare at 30%, “patient out-of-pocket costs” at 14%, and Med-
icaid at 15%. Id. 
 83 See Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Drug Companies’ Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2301 (2017) (noting a pharmaceutical company’s major role in perpetuating the 
U.S. opioid epidemic through fraud). Between 2000 and 2017, the opioid epidemic killed 300,000 
people in the United States. Id. Lawsuits against opioid manufacturers, including Purdue Pharma, 
began in the 2000s and have increased in recent years. Id. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that 
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Court cannot allow pharmaceutical companies to escape responsibility for the 
consequences of their unlawful conduct and should permit TPPs to utilize RICO 
as a powerful combatant against pharmaceutical fraud in the United States.84 
CONCLUSION 
In Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund v. 
Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co., the Ninth Circuit joined the First and Third Cir-
cuits in holding that a TPP may adequately allege proximate causation in civil 
RICO claims brought against pharmaceutical companies for their fraudulent 
misrepresentation of drug safety. The Second and Seventh Circuits, in contrast, 
have held that TPPs are too far removed from the alleged pharmaceutical fraud 
to satisfy the proximate causation requirement. The Ninth Circuit correctly 
rejected this holding and concluded that because TPPs were immediate victims 
of the pharmaceutical company’s fraud, they could uphold both the “direct re-
lation” and Holmes factors requirements of proximate cause. 
Using its proximate cause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court should re-
solve the current circuit split by making it clear that pharmaceutical companies 
may not escape liability by hiding behind the actions of prescribing physicians 
and PBMs. Until then, pharmaceutical companies will continue to act as mod-
ern-day organized crime enterprises, harming not only the lives of individual 
patients but the wellbeing of our healthcare system at large. 
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